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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--THE INAPPLICABILITY OF GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST TO THOSE
ARRESTED FOR TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS
Defendant Marsh was arrested at his residence in 1965 pursuant to an
arrest warrant issued for a 1963 speeding violation. In the process of effecting
the arrest, the officer searched the defendant's person, although no search
warrant had been issued. The search revealed a matchbook which contained
a slip of paper implicating the defendant in the playing of policy. Subsequent
to his arrest for the traffic violation, defendant was charged, tried and convicted
for possession of a policy slip.' Marsh appealed complaining that his timely
motion to suppress the evidence disclosed by the search was improperly denied.2
The New York Court of Appeals held3 that a police officer is not empowered to
conduct a search, as incident to a lawful arrest, when one is taken into custody
for a traffic violation pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. People v. Marsh, 20
N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1967).
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that there shall be no searches and seizures without the existence of probable
cause, and no warrants shall be issued in the absence of such probable cause.4
Searches and seizures are permissible without a warrant when incident to a
lawful arrest, 5 but this has traditionally been considered a limited privilege.0
Cases at the turn of the century limited warrantless searches in both character
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 975 which provides:
The possession, by any person other than a public officer, of any writing, paper, or
document representing or being a record of any chance, share or interest in numbers, sold,
given away, drawn or selected, or to be drawn or selected, or in what is commonly called
"policy," or in the nature of a bet, wager or insurance upon the drawing or selection, or
the drawn or selected numbers of any public or private lottery, or any paper, print, writing,
numbers of device, policy slip, or article of any kind, such as is commonly used in carrying
on, promoting or playing the game commonly called "policy" is presumptive evidence of
possession thereof knowingly and in violation of the provisions of section nine hundred and
seventy-four as amended L. 1926, c. 435, § 3 eff. July 1, 1926.
2. N.Y. C.C.P. § 813c provides:
A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and having reason-
able grounds to believe that the property, papers or things, hereinafter referred to as property
claimed to have been unlawfully obtained may be used as evidence against him in a criminal
proceeding, may move for the return of such property or for the suppression of its use as
evidence. The court shall hear evidence upon any issue of fact necessary to the determination
of the motion.
If the motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to
lawful detention, and in any event it shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal
proceeding against the moving party.
3. All concur, Breitel J., in result only, except Scileppi J., who dissents in an opinion
in which Burke J., concurs.
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV. provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
S. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; People v. Chiagles, 237
N.Y. 193, 142 N.. 583 (1923); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup.
Ct. 1954).
6. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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and scope. The character of the search was limited to weapons, fruits, or imple-
ments used to commit the crime for which the accused was arrested.7 The
scope was limited to the person of the accused and the premises within his
immediate physical control.8 These limitations were subsequently expanded to
include unlawfully possessed articles under the accused's immediate physical
control,9 and the premises where the arrest was effected.' 0 The right to search
absent a search warrant, as incident to a lawful arrest, was further expanded
to include articles unrelated to the purpose for which the search was conducted,
but which might be deemed instrumentalities and means of any crime committed
by the accused." Although the right to search certain parts of the premises
where the arrest was effected has been held not violative of the fourth amend-
ment, even if no search warrant has been issued,12 there is no right to conduct
a general search or rummaging of the premises.' 3
The character of the articles which the search seeks to reveal are to be
taken into consideration in determining the constitutionally permissable extent
of a search.' 4 A determination of reasonableness must be made on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of each case.'8 Under no circumstances, however,
may the power to search either one's person or premises without a warrant
exceed the authority of a written warrant.' 6 A search without a warrant, in
order to be constitutionally permissible, must actually be made as incident to
a valid arrest.' 7 Stricter requirements of reasonableness may apply where a
dwelling is searched,' 8 or where the premises were entirely separate from the
place where the arrest was made. 19
Recent developments have focused on probable cause, the absence of
which invalidates searches and seizures. The difficulty in applying the probable
cause standard is the relative subjectivity of the concept. The Supreme Court
first tried to inject some objectivity into the probable cause standard in 1925,
7. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); accord, Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
11. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
12. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which held: where the arrest of a
stamp dealer for possession and sale of postage stamps bearing forged overprints was valid,
a search without warrant, as incident to the valid arrest, of a desk, safe, and filing cabinets in
the small office which constituted accused's place of business and which was open to the
public, was a reasonable search and valid.
13. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
14. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Court provided that we must
look to the particular circumstances of each case. "The same meticulous investigation which
would be appropriate in a search for two small canceled checks could not be considered rea-
sonable where agents are seeking a stolen automobile or an illegal still." Id. at 152.
15. Id. at 344; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
16. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
17. See, e.g., Jones v. United State, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) ; Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); People v. Roach, 44 Misc. 2d 40, 253 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
18. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
19. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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when it held in Carroll v. United States20 that probable cause exists where the
facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge, and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is
being committed. A New York case, People v. Valentine,21 substituted a reason-
ably cautious police officer for the reasonably cautious man standard. This
obviously relaxed the restraints upon law enforcement officials due to the
fact that police are inherently more suspicious than the common citizen, and
therefore are more cautious. The Valentine rule proved to be of relatively
short duration when viewed in the context of the recently, and as of yet not
fully interpreted case of People v. Berger.22 The Supreme Court, in overruling
the New York Court of Appeals, reestablished the "reasonable man" standard
of Carroll. These general principles have not been directly applied, however,
where the arrest is for violation of a traffic ordinance.
There are no established uniform rules governing all searches and seizures.
Courts examine the surrounding circumstances of an arrest, the nature of the
offense charged, and other peculiarities of the case,23 all of which determine
whether the search was reasonable. In New York State, this test applies to
vehicles as well as people.24 The difficulty with applying the same vague stan-
dards of reasonableness for searching violators of traffic ordinances is the fact
that traffic violators are not treated as criminals under the law of New York .2
Section 155 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law expressly provides
that:
A traffic infraction is not a crime and the punishment therefor shall
not be deemed for any purpose, a penal or criminal punishment and
shall not affect or impair the credibility as a witness or otherwise of
any person convicted thereof.
Even prior to the enactment of this section, New York courts have held that
traffic infractions were not crimes.26 Moreover, a traffic ticket is not proof that
20. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
21. 17 N.Y.2d 128, 216 N.E.2d 321, 269 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1966). See also Jackson v.
United States, 302 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
22. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-56, (1967).
23. People v. Watldns, 19 I1. 2d 12, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
24. See People v. Beaman, 44 Misc. 2d 336, 253 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1964), which
held that a search of a defendant's car after he had been taken to a precinct house and sub-
jected to a sobriety test, was not incidental to the primary purpose of the arrest and was
therefore illegal. See also People v. Adorno, 37 Misc. 2d 36, 234 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct.
1962), which held that a taxicab during the period of hire is no more vulnerable to incidental
search than the hirer's residence.
25. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 155. See also N.Y. Rev. Pen. Law § 55.10(4) providing:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an offense which is defined as a
traffic infraction shall not be deemed a violation or a misdemeanor by the virtue of the
sentence perscribed therefore."
26. See, e.g., Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 136 N.E.2d 504, 154 N.Y.S.2d 37
(1956) ("The legislature's purpose in denominating a traffic law violation an infraction was
solely to prevent the offender being adjudicated and treated as a criminal." Id. at 478.),
People v. Malmud, 4 A.D.2d 86, 90, 164 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2d Dep't 1957) (A traffic violation
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a person has been guilty of some designated violation, for it is merely notice
to appear and be charged with a specific violation.27 These cases cast doubts
upon any theory that such an offense is sufficient to sustain a search without a
warrant. For example, some states hold that a search incident to an arrest for
a traffic violation is invalid if not for the tools and implements of the offense.
2 1
Thus a search would be permissible if the arresting officer was trying to
locate a bottle of liquor for one arrested for drunken driving, but a search for
a violation such as speeding, or making an illegal turn would not be per-
missible since not for tools or implements of the offense. A Kentucky case29 went
so far as to say that an arrest for a traffic violation does not give the arresting
officer authority to search a vehicle without a search warrant.30 Furthermore, a
search is not valid if it is made through the subterfuge of a pretended arrest
for a traffic violation, 31 thereby affirming the conclusion of the federal courts
that not every search following a lawful arrest is valid.32
In the instant case tle Court reasoned that a police officer is not entitled
to search a motorist for an ordinary traffic violation, and the fact that the
arrest was made subsequent to the actual occurrence of the violation in no way
altered the nature or consequences of the original violation. 3 The Court recog-
nized that searches may be made incident to a lawful arrest, and also that the
arrest of the defendant was valid. The Court refused, however, to halt its in-
quiry at that point, which would have affirmed the conviction, and focused its
attention upon the legislative intent and the spirit of the law. Chief Judge Fuld
claimed that, for the purposes of search and seizure, the legislature never in-
tended to include traffic violators in the same category as those arrested for
more serious crimes.3 4 The Court concluded that, with respect to the traffic
violator, "the statutory scheme does not contemplate treating him as a common
criminal to be booked, photographed, fingerprinted and jailed," 35 The Court then
reasoned that the search in the instant case was unreasonable, and evidence
obtained as a result of such an illegal search should be suppressed.
36
It is submitted that the Court avoided the most obvious, and perhaps the
most persuasive argument for reversal. The Court simply could have declared
the search to be unreasonable. A search of the defendant two years subsequent
is not a crime.); Lea v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 24, 126 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (Speeding
is a traffic violation and not a crime.). See also (1953) Op. Att'y Gen. 103.
27. In People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143 N.E.2d 901, 164 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1957), the
Court stated that the uniform traffic ticket is merely a notice to appear in a given court on
a given day to be charged with a specific crime, and is not sufficient information to be
used as a pleading in prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
28. Courington v. State, 74 So. 2d 652 (Fla., 1954).
29. Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965).
30. Id. at 743.
31. See, e.g., People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956); Collins
v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953); People v. Lee, 371 Mich. 563, 124 N.W.2d 736 (1963).
32. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
33. People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1967).
34. Id. at 102, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
35. Id., 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
36. Id., 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
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to the date of the arrest could not possibly have produced any evidence of the
traffic violation which the defendant was accused of committing. Therefore, the
search must be characterized as merely exploratory, and as a result, evidence ob-
tained therefrom must be suppressed37 The contention that the officer was
searching for a weapon may be quickly refuted in view of the nature of the evi-
dence confiscated. One could hardly expect a weapon to be hidden on the inside
of a matchbook cover. The impact of the decision weighs heavily in the area of
search and seizure, however, because the Court chose to confront the issues
directly, taking into account not only judicial precedents, but also legislative
intent. Through this rationale, the Court narrowed the issue specifically to
traffic violations. Had the Court upheld the search, the decision could have been
construed as a license to search whenever a traffic ordinance has been violated.
The legislature has acknowledged that the overwhelming number of traffic vio-
lators are not criminals. 38 Therefore, traffic violators should not be subjected to
degrading and unreasonable searches in violation of their constitutional guar-
antees.
39
The strange procedure followed by the police in the instant case, coupled
with the fact that the arresting officer actually conducted a search, suggests that
the case may be more complicated than the decision would lead one to believe.
It is possible that the police were looking for some excuse to search the defen-
dant's person or premises, and that the traffic citation presented the opportunity
they were seeking. If this element were actually present in the case, it may have
had an important bearing on the courts requiring more stringent limitations on
the police power of search and seizure.
MAuuc A. HULNICK
37. McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950): Officers, without a
warrant or enough evidence to obtain one, broke into a house in order to seize evidence they
hoped to find. They found it, but the search was held to be in violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
United States v. Hirsch, 57 F.2d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1932): A forced entry into a suspicious
looking building which was later discovered to have housed a still, was declared an explora-
tory search and therefore unconstitutional.
People v. Molaris, 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956): A search of defendant's
car for no apparent reason, disclosed narcotics. The court held the search exploratory and
therefore unconstitutional.
Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953): An officer searched a car. The court held the
officer making the search must be prepared to show the court that information he possessed
purportedly giving rise to his reasonable belief that the automobile was carrying contraband
was sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant if he had obtained one.
People v. DeLuca, 343 Ill. 269, 175 N.E. 370 (1931): Search of defendant's person while
on board a train by officers hoping to find evidence of a violation of the gaming laws was
held unconstitutional.
People v. Lee, 371 Mich. 563, 124 N.W.2d 736 (1963): An officer stopped an automobile
because of the poor condition of the license plate. The officer then proceeded to search the
vehicle, and found narcotics hidden under the cushion. The court held it was illegally seized
and therefore not admissible into evidence.
38. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 155.
39. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
